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In response to the observed violations of expected utility, several generalizations of
expected utility have been proposed (Starmer, 2000). Among these generalizations, Gul’s
(1991) theory of Disappointment Aversion (DA) has several attractive features. First it is
intuitive, being based on the idea that a decision maker when evaluating a prospect forms
a prior expectation and experiences disappointment when the prospect results in an out-
come that is worse than this prior expectation. Second, DA is analytically tractable. Third,
DA is a parsimonious theory, being only one parameter richer than expected utility. This
extra parameter reflects people’s disappointment aversion. DA’s parsimony is an impor-
tant advantage in applications. A formal definition of the DA model, which explains
the model’s characteristics in detail, is given in Section 2.
Several other disappointment models exist which are based on a similar intuition as DA
(Bell, 1985; Delquie´ & Cillo, 2006a, 2006b; Grant & Kajii, 1998; Jia, Dyer, & Butler, 2001;
Loomes & Sugden, 1986). The class of preferences considered in these models is different
from DA, however. The main difference is that in DA the decision maker’s prior expecta-
tion of a prospect is endogenously determined, whereas in the other disappointment mod-
els the prior expectation is exogenously determined. We will briefly consider these
alternative models in Section 6.
In spite of its desirable features, DA has not been used in applications. One reason for
this neglect might be that no straightforward procedure exists to elicit the model. Tradi-
tional utility measurement techniques, such as probability equivalence, certainty equiva-
lence, and lottery equivalence (Farquhar, 1984; McCord & de Neufville, 1986), cannot
be used because they are vulnerable to violations of expected utility. Wakker and Deneffe
(1996) developed the tradeoff method to measure utility when people behave according to
rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1981; Yaari, 1987), i.e., when they weight probabilities.
We show that in the choices involved in the tradeoff method, DA is a special case of
rank-dependent utility and, hence, the tradeoff method can also be used to elicit utility
under DA. Once utility is known, the elicitation of the disappointment aversion parameter
is straightforward. The tradeoff method allows to elicit the complete DA model and
requires no assumptions about utility or disappointment aversion.
The availability of a procedure to elicit DA makes it possible to test the restrictions
imposed by DA. We used data from Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000)
to test DA. Taken together, these data allow a test of DA in three outcome domains, mon-
etary gains, monetary losses, and life-years, using both hypothetical and incentivized ques-
tions. A priori there is some reason to doubt the descriptive validity of DA. As we show in
Section 2, as a special case of rank-dependent utility, DA does not allow for the most com-
monly observed pattern of probability weighting. The test of DA is interesting nevertheless
as the deviations from DA can suggest ways to extend the model.
Previous evidence on the DA model yielded mixed results. Camerer and Ho (1994)
tested betweenness, a central assumption of DA, and found systematic violations. Loomes
and Segal (1994) tested the order of magnitude of decision makers’ attitudes towards risk
and found no support for the pattern predicted by DA. Hey and Orme (1994) found that
DA did not fit their data well. On the other hand, when Camerer and Ho (1994) allowed
for random error and fitted stochastic choice models to their data, DA accommodated the
data well and provided a comparable fit as prospect theory, the leading descriptive theory
of decision under risk. Morone and Schmidt (2002) found that, among expected utility and
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ingness to accept and willingness to pay responses. Blavatskyy (2006) showed that most
previously observed violations of betweenness could be explained by random errors. Har-
less and Camerer (1994) concluded that there is room for a theory that is richer than EU in
the sense of being able to explain a few common violations of expected utility, but that is
leaner than many of the generalizations of expected utility that allow a lot of patterns that
are rarely observed. This description might fit DA. As noted above, the DA model is only
one parameter richer than expected utility and the deviations from expected utility that it
allows are commonly observed. For example, in the unit triangle DA allows for the com-
monly observed mixed fanning pattern, fanning in for relatively attractive prospects, i.e.,
prospects in the northwest corner of the triangle, and fanning out for relatively unattrac-
tive prospects, prospects in the southeast corner of the triangle (Chew & Waller, 1986;
Conlisk, 1989; Neilson, 1992; Starmer, 2000).
A quantitative measurement of disappointment aversion is not only important for
descriptive purposes, but also for applied decision analysis, where prescriptions have to
be made. There is no consensus on the prescriptive status of disappointment models. Loo-
mes and Sugden (1986) defend the normative status of disappointment. They argue that
when people consistently maximize expected satisfaction where that expectation includes
the anticipation of possible disappointment and elation, there is no reason why such a
maximand would be irrational. Similar arguments have been put forward by Bell
(1985) and Delquie´ and Cillo (2006a). Others, who have recognized the descriptive limi-
tations of expected utility have been more reluctant to abandon the normative validity
of expected utility (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Savage, 1954). Irrespective of the
prescriptive status of the DA model, it is important for applied decision analysis to be able
to measure disappointment if disappointment affects decision makers’ preferences. This is
clearly the case if the DA model is considered normative because then feelings of disap-
pointment should be included in the analysis. However, it is also true if the DA model is
merely considered descriptive. Prescriptive decision making require the measurement of
utilities. Measuring utilities is a descriptive task and, hence, susceptible to the biases that
lead to violations of expected utility. To correct for these biases a method is needed that
can separate utility from other factors affecting preferences. Our measurement method
allows such a separation between disappointment and utility. Hence, if disappointment
affects a decision maker’s preferences and expected utility is considered normative then
our method can be used to correct expected utilities for disappointment. As we explain
in Section 3, our method can also be useful in the correction of utility measurements from
traditional methods such as the probability equivalence and certainty equivalence
methods.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the DA model and we show
that for binary prospects DA is a special case of rank-dependent utility. In Section 3, we
describe how DA can be measured by the tradeoff method. Section 4 briefly describes how
the data in Abdellaoui (2000) and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), that we used to elicit and
test DA, were collected. Section 5 presents the results. The data suggest that DA is too
parsimonious. Rather than being constant, which is what DA predicts, disappointment
aversion increases with the probability of obtaining an elation outcome. In Section 6,
we examine to what extent our findings are consistent with the other theories of disap-
pointment aversion that have been proposed in the literature. We also performed a
curve-fitting of a two-parameter functional form for disappointment aversion that allows
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tion 7 concludes.2. Disappointment aversion theory
Let X be a set of outcomes, elements of which are denoted by x, y. We assume that out-
comes are real numbers. In the experiments reported below, outcomes designate monetary
gains and losses and life-years.
Let P be the set of prospects. A typical prospect is denoted (p1:x1, . . . , pn:xn), yielding
outcome xi with probability pi, i = 1, . . . , n, where the probabilities pi sum to one. A pros-
pect is riskless if x1 =    = xn or if pi = 1 for some i. A preference relation < is defined
over P. As usual,  denotes the asymmetric part of < and  denotes its symmetric part.
Preferences over outcomes are derived from preferences over riskless prospects. For con-
venience, we assume that < is monotonic: higher outcomes are preferred to lower out-
comes. We denote prospects in a rank-ordered way, i.e., it is implicit in the notation
(p1:x1, . . . , pn:xn) that x1P   P xn.
Let q be any prospect (q1:x1, . . . , qn:xn). Then there will be some 1 6 k 6 n such that for
all i 6 k, xi<q and for all i > k, q<xi. We can decompose q into prospects
r = (r1:x1, . . . , rk:xk) and s = (sk+1:xk+1, . . . , sn:xn) such that q = ar + (l  a)s. Hence, all
outcomes of r are at least as good as q and q is at least as good as all outcomes of s.
The prospect r is the elation component of q, which is unambiguously better than q itself
and the prospect s is the disappointment component of q, which is unambiguously worse
than q itself. The parameter a can be interpreted as the probability that an elation outcome
obtains. Disappointment aversion theory (DA) holds if prospect q = (q1:x1, . . . ,
qn:xn) = ar + (1  a)s is evaluated by
cðaÞ
Xk
i¼1
riUðxiÞ þ ð1 cðaÞÞ
Xn
i¼kþ1
siUðxiÞ ð1Þ
and preferences and choices correspond with this evaluation. In Eq. (1), U is a utility func-
tion from the set of outcomes to the reals and c is a unique function from [0,1] to [0,1]
defined by cðaÞ ¼ a
1þð1  aÞb with b 2 (1,1). The parameter b is the disappointment aver-
sion parameter. Gul (1991) defined < to be disappointment averse if bP 0 and elation lov-
ing if b 2 (1,0]. Gul (1991, Theorem 5) showed that, ceteris paribus, the more risk averse
a decision maker is the higher is b. Expected utility is the special case of Eq. (1) where
b = 0. Eq. (1) shows that b is the only parameter that the DA model adds to expected util-
ity. Because disappointment aversion can be characterized through one parameter, disap-
pointment aversion, unlike risk aversion, is a global property. Gul (1991, Theorem 2)
showed that in the Allais paradox b > 0. In their parametric estimation of the DA func-
tional, Hey and Orme (1994) observed both positive and negative estimates of b.
For binary prospects (p:x;y), which give x with probability p and y with probability
1  p, x > y, the elation component is x, the disappointment component is y, and a = p
so that the DA model reduces to
cðpÞUðxÞ þ ð1 cðpÞÞUðyÞ: ð2Þ
It is easy to verify that c(0) = 0, c(1) = 1 and that c is increasing in p. Hence, c satisfies the
requirements for a probability weighting function in rank-dependent utility (Quiggin,
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Fig. 1. Probability weighting functions implied by different values of beta.
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of rank-dependent utility.
The assumption that disappointment aversion is a global property implies restrictions
on the shape of the probability weighting function when we consider DA as a special case
of rank-dependent utility. Fig. 1 displays the shape of the probability weighting function
for several values of b. The figure shows that in DA the probability weighting function is
either concave, implying overweighting of probabilities, when the decision maker is elation
loving, or convex, implying underweighting of probabilities when the decision maker is
disappointment averse. DA cannot accommodate a probability weighting function that
has both concave and convex parts.
Several empirical studies have shown, however, that the probability weighting function
is commonly inverse S-shaped implying overweighting of small probabilities and under-
weighting of larger probabilities (e.g. Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2000; Gonzalez
& Wu, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) although convex probability weighting has also
been observed (Jullien & Salanie´, 2000; van de Kuilen, Wakker, & Zou, 2006). The inverse
S-shape implies that people are particularly sensitive to small changes in probability from
impossible to possible, a phenomenon referred to as the possibility effect, and from possible
to certain, referred to as the certainty effect. The possibility effect and the certainty effect
cannot be captured both by DA. DA is consistent with the possibility effect when the deci-
sion maker is elation loving and with the certainty effect when the decision maker is disap-
pointment averse. If a decision maker behaves both according to the certainty effect and the
possibility effect then we expect to find that the disappointment aversion parameter is not
constant, but starts off negative and increases with the probability of the elation outcome.3. The tradeoff method
The elicitation procedure for DA consists of two stages. In the first stage the utility
function is elicited. Given u(Æ), the second stage elicits the disappointment aversion
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stability of b and hence the validity of the DA model. As will become apparent, our elic-
itation imposes no assumptions on the utility function or on b. Hence, the elicitation and
test of the DA model are parameter-free.
The elicitation of U and b was performed by the tradeoff method (Wakker & Deneffe,
1996). Wakker and Deneffe showed that the tradeoff method elicits valid utilities under
rank-dependent utility. The tradeoff method only uses binary prospects and, as we showed
in Section 2, for binary prospects, DA is a special case of rank-dependent utility. There-
fore, the tradeoff method can also be used to elicit the utility function under DA.
3.1. Elicitation of utility
The first step in the tradeoff method is to fix two gauge outcomes R and r, a starting
outcome x0 and a probability p. A value x1 is elicited so that the subject is indifferent
between (p:x0; R) and (p:x1; r). We then substitute the elicited number x1 for x0 and elicit
the value x2 so that the subject is indifferent between (p:x1; R) and (p:x2; r). By repeating
this procedure, a standard sequence x0,x1, . . ., xk results where for j 2 {l, . . ., k} we have
(p:xj1; R)  (p:xj; r). For monetary gains and life-years, we chose the gauge outcomes
R and r so that R > r. It follows that the standard sequence is increasing, i.e.,
x0 <   < xk. For monetary losses, we chose r > R and the standard sequence is decreasing,
i.e., x0 > x1 >    > xk.
Evaluating the indifferences (p:xj1; R)  (p:xj; r) gives by DA
cðpÞUðxj1Þ þ ð1 cðpÞÞUðRÞ ¼ cðpÞUðxjÞ þ ðl cðpÞÞUðrÞ ð3Þ
or
UðxjÞ  Uðxj1Þ ¼ 1 cðpÞcðpÞ ðUðRÞ  UðrÞÞ: ð4Þ
Since this holds for all j in {1, . . ., k}, the utility difference between two successive elements
of the standard sequence is constant.
For monetary gains and life-years, we normalized utility so that U(x0) = 0 and
U(xk) = 1. It follows that U(xj) = j/k, j = 0, . . ., k. For monetary losses, we normalized
utility so that U(x0) = 0 and U(xk) = 1 and, therefore, U(xj) =  j/k, j = 0, . . ., k.
3.2. Elicitation of disappointment aversion
After the elicitation of the utility function through the construction of a standard
sequence x0, x1, . . ., xk, the only remaining parameter that needs to be assessed is the dis-
appointment aversion parameter b. Suppose that the standard sequence is increasing. The
most straightforward method to elicit b is to fix an element xj of the standard sequence and
then to elicit the probability pj that makes the subject indifferent between xj for sure and
the prospect (pj:xk; x0). It follows from DA that
UðxjÞ ¼ cðpjÞUðxkÞ þ ð1 cðpjÞÞUðx0Þ; ð5Þ
or cðpjÞ ¼ UðxjÞUðx0ÞUðxkÞUðx0Þ ¼ j=k. When the standard sequence is decreasing, then the probability
pj is elicited that makes the subject indifferent between and (pj:x0;xk). This k  j indiffer-
ence implies by DA that cðpjÞ ¼ kjk .
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b ¼ pj  cðpiÞ
cðpjÞð1 pjÞ
: ð6Þ
By varying xj we can elicit different observations of b. As noted in Section 2, DA predicts
that the elicited values of b are all equal; any differences must due to random error.
A disadvantage of the above procedure may be that the question format and the
response scale differ between the first stage, the elicitation of the utility function, and
the second stage, the elicitation of the disappointment aversion parameter. In the first
stage, both prospects are risky and the response scale is outcome (xj), in the second stage
one of the prospects is riskless and the response scale is probability (pj). Several studies
suggest that varying the response scale may lead to distortions in the elicited preferences
(Delquie´, 1993; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). One way to mitigate the effect of such
distortions is to obfuscate that probability is the response scale, for example by eliciting
indifference through a sequence of choices.
An alternative procedure to elicit the disappointment aversion parameter, which holds
the question format and the response scale fixed across the two stages and, therefore, may
be less susceptible to distortions, is the following. Fix three different elements of the stan-
dard sequence that was elicited in the first stage, say xj1, xj2, xj3 with x j1 < xj2 < xj3. Also
fix a probability p. Then elicit the outcome z so that the subject is indifferent between
(p:xj3; xj2) and (p:z; xj3). It follows from DA that
cðpÞ ¼
j2
k  j1k
UðzÞ  j3k
  j2
k  j1k
  ð7Þ
and the formula for b follows from Eq. (6). A test of DA is obtained by varying the prob-
ability p across questions, thereby eliciting several values of b. Again, DA predicts that the
obtained values are all equal, except for random error.
A disadvantage of the second elicitation procedure is that U(z) is in general unknown
and has to be determined through interpolation. As long as successive elements of the
standard sequence are relatively close this will cause no problems.
A potential problem of both approaches is error propagation: an error made during the
elicitation of the utility function affects the elicitation of subsequent elements of the stan-
dard sequence and of the disappointment aversion parameter. Abdellaoui (2000) and
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) showed that error propagation caused no problems for the
elicitation of the probability weighting function, and thus of b, by the two methods
described above (see also Abdellaoui, Vossmann, & Weber, 2005).3.3. Use of our method in applications
The above procedure requires that outcomes are quantitative. For qualitative outcomes
like health states the tradeoff method cannot be applied. The way to proceed for such out-
comes is as follows. First apply our method for quantitative outcomes to determine b. For
example, in the health domain one could determine b by using life durations as outcomes.
Knowledge of b can then be used to correct traditional utility measurements for disap-
pointment. Consider, for example, the probability equivalence method, which is widely
used in medical decision making to determine the utility of health states. A common
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makes him indifferent between a given impaired health state, say back pain, for sure
and a treatment option that gives probability p of full health and probability 1  p of
death within a week. Under expected utility and the scaling U(full health) = 1 and U(death
within a week) = 0 it follows that the utility of back pain is equal to p. The same scaling
implies that under the DA model the utility of back pain is equal to c(p). Knowledge of b
determines c(p) and allows to reassess existing utility measurements and to correct these
for disappointment so as to arrive at more realistic utilities for health.4. Experiments
4.1. First experiment: monetary gains and losses
The first elicitation/test of the DA model that we performed used the data from Abd-
ellaoui (2000). In this study, monetary outcomes were used. Forty French undergraduate
and Ph.D. students in economics participated, who were paid FF 150 (approximately €23)
for their participation. Separate elicitations of U and b were performed for gains and for
losses. Subjects were told that for gains one subject would be randomly selected to play for
real money one of his answers in the first stage of the elicitation and one of his answers in
the second stage of the elicitation. For losses a similar incentive mechanism is ethically
objectionable and, hence, no real incentives were used for losses.
To elicit the utility function, the outcomes jx0j, jRj, and jrj were fixed at FF 1000 (€150),
FF 500 (€75), and 0, respectively. The probability p was set equal to 2/3. Standard
sequences of seven elements, x0, x1, . . ., X6, were constructed. Hence, subjects faced the
options (2/3: 500;xj) and (2/3:xj+1;0) for gains and the options (1/3: 500; xj) and
(1/3:0; xj+1) for losses, j = 0, . . ., 5. As has been mentioned before, the standard sequences
were increasing for gains and decreasing for losses. Indifferences between the options were
elicited by a choice-based procedure.
To elicit b, the first procedure described in Section 3.2 was used, where, to avoid distor-
tions, the indifference probabilities were elicited by a choice-based procedure. Each subject
was asked a series of choices aiming to determine the probabilities p1, . . . , p5 that made
him indifferent between xj and (pj:x6;x0) for gains and between xj and (pj:x0;x6) for losses,
j = 1, . . ., 5. Several consistency questions were included, which indicated no systematic
inconsistencies. A more detailed description of the experimental procedure is given in
Abdellaoui (2000).
4.2. Second experiment: life-years
The second elicitation/test of the DA model used the data from Bleichrodt and Pinto
(2000). The outcomes in this study were life-years. Fifty-one Spanish undergraduate eco-
nomics students participated, who were paid Ptas 5000 (approximately €30). Obviously,
real incentives could not be used.
Prospects were described as medical treatments. Subjects were asked to imagine that
they displayed symptoms that implied that they had one of two diseases; it was unknown
from which disease they suffered. Subjects were asked to choose between two treatments to
cure the symptoms.
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and 45 years respectively. Hence, in the second experiment the gauge outcomes were more
attractive than the elements of the standard sequence. This does not affect the conclusions
of Section 3.1 as long as r is at least as large as the final element of the standard sequence.
The probability p was set equal to 1/2. Standard sequences of seven elements,
x0, x1, . . ., x6, were constructed. Hence, subjects faced the options (1/2:55 years; xj) and
(1/2:45 years; xj + 1), j = 0, . . . , 5. Indifferences were elicited by matching.
To elicit b, the second procedure described in Section 3.2. was used. The utility of z was
estimated both by linear interpolation and by interpolation based on a power function
estimated from the data of the first stage (the utility elicitation). Five probabilities pi were
used: 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90. For probabilities 0.10, 0.25, and 0.50, subjects were
asked to state their indifference value z in the comparison between (p:x4;x3) and (p:x5; z).
1
For probabilities 0.75 and 0.90, subjects were asked to state their indifference value z in the
comparison between (p: x3; x2) and (p:z;x1). The value of b then followed from Eqs. (6)
and (7). Several consistency questions were included. They indicated no systematic incon-
sistencies. A more detailed description of the experimental procedure is given in Bleichrodt
and Pinto (2000).5. Results
All responses were included in the analysis of the first experiment. In the analysis of the
second experiment, the responses of two subjects were discarded. One subject refused to
make any tradeoffs, for the other subject x6 > 45 years = r and hence rank-ordering of
prospects was violated.
5.1. Utility
Fig. 2 displays the elicited utility functions across the three outcome domains. The fig-
ure shows that the utility function is mildly concave for gains, mildly convex for losses,
and concave for life-years. To smoothen out response errors, for each subject a parametric
estimation of the utility function was performed where it was assumed that the utility func-
tion was a power function. The power function was chosen because previous studies
observed that it provided an excellent fit to the data. Median power coefficients were
0.89 for gains, 0.92 for losses and 0.77 for life-years.
The aggregate data were confirmed by individual-subject analysis. Both for monetary
gains and for life-years, most subjects had a concave utility function. For both outcome
domains, there were significantly more subjects with concave than subjects with convex
utility functions (p < 0.01, binomial, one-tailed). For monetary losses, the modal shape
of the utility function was convex. There were significantly more convex utility functions
than concave utility functions (p = 0.025, binomial, one-tailed). Further details, e.g. with
respect to the classification used, are in Abdellaoui (2000) and in Bleichrodt and Pinto
(2000).1 Then cðpÞ ¼ ð1=2ÞUðzÞð2=3ÞuðzÞ .
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Fig. 2. Elicited utility functions for gains, losses, and life-years.
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Table 1 gives an overview of the individual results. The table shows that for each of the
three outcome domains the proportion of disappointment averse subjects, i.e. those for
whom b > 0, increased with the probability of the elation outcome. That disappointment
aversion increases with the probability of the elation outcome seems intuitive. If the prob-
ability of success is small, people will not really count on it and will feel little disappoint-
ment when the elation outcome does not obtain. If the probability of success is high,
people will feel more disappointed when the elation outcome does not obtain.
Fig. 3 plots the probabilities and the median values for the disappointment aversion
parameter b for gains, losses, and life-years. For life-years only the relationship under lin-
ear interpolation is displayed. The relationship under power interpolation is similar.
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Fig. 3. Elicited values of the disappointment aversion parameter.
Table 1
Proportion of disappointment averse subjects
Elicitation Gains (%) Losses (%) Life-years (%)
1 37.5 5 4.2
2 57.5 22.5 25.6
3 75 40 74.5
4 90 52.5 83.7
5 97.5 72.5 91.3
Note: For gains and losses elicitation j measured pj = w
1(j/6), j = 1, . . ., 5. For life-years elicitation j measured
w(pj) with p1, . . ., p5 = 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90.
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level either. The hypothesis of constant b is rejected for all outcome domains (p < 0.001
both by ANOVA with repeated measures and by the nonparametric Friedman test). Since
expected utility is the special case of DA where b = 0, the data also reject expected utility.
In terms of the probability weighting function, the finding that disappointment aversion
increases with the probability of the elation outcome entails that the data are consistent
with a probability weighting function that overweights small probabilities and under-
weights large probabilities, and thus with the joint existence of the possibility effect and
the certainty effect.
Table 1 and Fig. 3 suggest that, for the probabilities considered, disappointment aver-
sion is higher for gains than for losses. Sign-dependence of the disappointment aversion
parameter is confirmed by a signed rank-test (z = 3.42, p = 0.001). The median disap-
pointment aversion parameter also differs significantly between gains and life-years
(z = 4.32, p < 0.001, Mann–Whitney Test). No significant differences were found
between losses and life-years (z = 1.485, p = 0.138, Mann–Whitney Test). In comparing
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dure for eliciting b was different for money than for life duration. This difference in
elicitation procedure may have confounded the comparison. We return to this issue in
Section 7.6. Other disappointment models
Let us now briefly consider the question whether the other disappointment models that
have been proposed in the literature can account for our finding that disappointment aver-
sion, and, hence, risk aversion, increases with the probability of the elation component. A
caveat that should be kept in mind in performing such an analysis is that our method was
not specifically designed to elicit these other disappointment theories.
Bell (1985) proposed the following functional form for a binary prospect (p:x;y), x > y,
pxþ ð1 pÞy þ ðe dÞpð1 pÞðx yÞ; ð8Þ
where e is a constant reflecting the degree to which a unit of elation affects the decision
maker and d is a constant that reflects the degree to which a unit of disappointment affects
a decision maker. Eq. (8) can be rewritten as w(p)x + (1  w(p))y with
wðpÞ ¼ ðp þ ðe dÞpð1 pÞÞ: ð9Þ
Bell’s model is a special form of rank-dependent utility with linear utility and the proba-
bility weighting function given by Eq. (9). It is obvious from this equation that w(p) either
underweights or overweights probabilities but cannot account for the inverse S-shape.
Consequently, our data are not consistent with Bell’s model of disappointment aversion
and neither with the model of Jia et al. (2001), which is identical to Bell’s model for
two outcome prospects. The model of Grant and Kajii (1998) corresponds to rank-depen-
dent utility with a power probability function w(p) = pa and can only account for under-
weighting of probabilities, i.e. disappointment aversion. Therefore, their model is not
consistent with our data either.
Delquie´ and Cillo (2006a) suggested that (p:x;y) be evaluated as
puðxÞ þ pð1 pÞEðuðxÞ  uðyÞÞ þ ð1 pÞuðyÞ  ð1 pÞpDðuðxÞ  uðyÞÞ; ð10Þ
where E is a real-valued function capturing sensitivity to elation and D is a real-val-
ued function capturing sensitivity to disappointment. Both E and D are nondecreasing
and satisfy Eð0Þ ¼ Dð0Þ ¼ 0. Delquie´ and Cillo’s model cannot account for the increasing
relationship between disappointment aversion and the probability of the elation compo-
nent: disappointment aversion is the same when the probability of the elation component
is, say, 0.10 as when it is 0.90. Hence, Delquie´ and Cillo’s model cannot account for our
data.
Finally, Loomes and Sugden (1986) proposed the following functional form for the
evaluation of (p:x;y):
puðxÞ þ pDðuðxÞ  ðpuðxÞ þ ð1 pÞuðyÞÞÞ þ ð1 pÞuðyÞ þ ð1 pÞDðuðyÞ  ðpuðxÞ
þ ð1 pÞuðyÞÞÞ
¼ puðxÞ þ pDðð1 pÞðuðxÞ  uðyÞÞÞ þ ð1 pÞuðyÞ  ð1 pÞDðpðuðxÞ  uðyÞÞÞ:
ð11Þ
Table 2
Parameter estimates for the exponential form b = a + ebp
a b
Gains 1.06 1.62
(1.97, 0.62) (0.80, 2.74)
Losses 1.70 0.50
(1.99, 1.40) (0.05, 1.82)
Life-years 1.79 1.33
(1.99, 1.60) (0.67, 1.77)
Interquartile ranges of individual parameters of a and b are in parentheses.
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The function D captures sensitivity to elation when the utility of an outcome is larger than
the prior expectation and sensitivity to disappointment when the utility of an outcome is
less than the prior expectation. D is nondecreasing, satisfies Dð0Þ ¼ 0 and DðxÞ ¼ DðxÞ
for all x > 0, and is convex on its positive domain and concave on its negative domain.
Under these assumptions Loomes and Sugden’s (1986) model predicts that disappoint-
ment aversion increases with the probability of the elation component x, a prediction that
is in accord with our data.
Loomes and Sugden’s (1986) model is more sophisticated, however, than the DA model
and there exists as yet no method to elicit their model. We therefore explored whether add-
ing one additional parameter to the DA model, which reflects how disappointment aver-
sion varies with the probability of obtaining an elation outcome, could account for our
data. This extended DA model is still tractable and may suggest ways to generalize the
DA model. Of the two-parameter functional forms that we examined (linear, quadratic,
power, exponential, expo-power (Saha, 1993), and HARA (Merton, 1971)) the exponen-
tial form b = a + eba, where a is the probability of obtaining an elation outcome, fitted
the data best based on the criterion ‘‘minimize the sum of the squared errors subject to
b > 1.’’
The curve-fitting yielded mixed results. As Table 2 shows, the median estimates for b
differed substantially across the three domains. The difference was significant between
losses and gains (p = 0.012); the other differences were not significant. There was a lot
of variation in the elicited values of b at the individual level. The fit was good for losses
and for life-years, but less so for gains.7. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a method to measure DA, a popular nonexpected utility
model that generalizes expected utility by adding one parameter. The availability of an
elicitation method is important both for descriptive purposes, to test the descriptive accu-
racy of the DA model, and for applications as our method allows separating utility and
disappointment. Moreover, knowledge of the disappointment parameter b makes it possi-
ble to correct utility measurements using traditional measurement tools, such as the prob-
ability equivalence and certainty equivalence methods, for disappointment.
Our descriptive test of the DA model showed that disappointment aversion is not con-
stant, as DA assumes, but varies with the probability of the elation outcome. This pattern
appears robust: we found it both for monetary and for health outcomes, both for gains and
644 M. Abdellaoui, H. Bleichrodt / Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (2007) 631–645for losses, and both for hypothetical and for incentivized questions. We found evidence of
sign-dependence of disappointment aversion: disappointment aversion was higher for gains
than for losses. Evidence on outcome-dependence was less clear. The conclusions about
outcome-dependence are necessarily tentative as the elicitation processes differed for money
outcomes and for life duration. The extent to which these differences confound the compar-
ison between the two domains is unclear. It is well known that preference measurements are
generally volatile and depend on the way preferences are measured. On the other hand the
different elicitation procedures need not lead to systematic biases in the elicited values of the
disappointment parameter. Consider for example scale compatibility, which says that
the decision maker will overweight the response scale used. If probability is used as the
response scale, scale compatibility predicts that subjects will focus more on the probabilities
in responding to the questions than when outcome is used as the response scale. Scale com-
patibility does not predict on which probability subjects will focus. If they focus on the
probability of the elation outcome then the disappointment parameter will be lower than
when they focus on the probability of the disappointment outcome. The potential bias aris-
ing from the difference in elicitation procedure is ambiguous.
Of the other disappointment models that have been proposed in the literature, our data
are only consistent with the model of Loomes and Sugden (1986). Our method for mea-
suring the DA model does not apply to Loomes and Sugden’s model, however, and
restraint should be exercised in drawing strong inferences about the validity of the other
disappointment models based on our data alone. Future research may try to construct
a method that allows measuring Loomes and Sugden’s model to obtain a proper test of
that theory and to improve its applicability.
Another possibility would be to generalize the DA model by allowing disappointment
aversion to vary with the probability of the elation outcome, while keeping the model trac-
table. We performed some preliminary analysis on this topic by fitting two-parameter func-
tional forms to our data. The findings of our curve-fitting exercise are mixed: they are more
satisfactory for losses and life-years than for gains. An interesting test that may be addressed
in future research is whether the fitted curves are consistent with other available data
and how well they predict choices between prospects involving more than two outcomes.
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